12:47 30/12/2011
?Socio-political logic? would suggest that there are significant reasons to consider further (re-)integration of the post-Soviet space. Politics, however, is much less logical. Or rather, it tends to be guided by a different logic. This is why the process has not yet been successful.
Let?s briefly consider the most obvious potential advantages of closer integration. The first is the change in the size of the market (from 140 to more than 220 million people) and the potential economic benefits (proved - to some degree at least ? by the EU and NAFTA) from lowering or eliminating trade barriers and banking restrictions. The second is demographics. Quite simply, the Russian population is getting older and smaller while central Asia and Ukraine has a surplus of able-bodied and under-employed youth. Thirdly, meaningful political integration (even at a low level) may increase the region?s competitive geo-strategic position (particularly given the current political and economic shifts which are moving the center of world gravity towards Asia). In theory, then, integration should definitely be an attractive idea. In practice, however, recent attempts at re-integration of the post-Soviet space (maybe with the exception of the customs union) have not been very successful. And future plans for re-integration ? if implemented in a similar fashion as the previous attempts ? will most likely fail as well.
What went wrong, then? Let?s begin with the ?idea? itself. So far initiatives at re-integration have been the exclusive domain of the Russian leaders and have therefore been based on strong political will and almost nothing more. It is not enough to propose ?something right? without backing it with specific policies; without careful calculations of what other players gain or lose; without huge resources ready to be directed into new projects; without support from business community. What can be done domestically in Russia through the creation of new realities out of pure political will cannot be replicated internationally, even with much weaker partners. Russia is great at generating ideas, but not in their implementation.
There is a lot more to this than just lacking sound policies. From the perspective of the ?states to be re-integrated,? Russia has not yet created an attractive development model for the post-Soviet space for them to link into. The Russian developmental state model, which was quite successfully used from 2000 until about 2007, is not showing the same vigor it once did. Endemic corruption and a politicized and bureaucratized economy cannot be as attractive as, for instance, the Chinese (foreign investor-friendly) or Brazilian (including poorer social strata into a market economy) models. Nor is Russia an attractive political model to be emulated. For some, like Uzbekistan, it is too soft and open, and for others, like Ukraine and the Baltic states, it is not democratic enough. Also, economically speaking, most of the Central Asian states have, like Russia, primarily resource-based economies. As such, they could just as easily be competitive as complementary. Like Russia, they are deindustrializing, and have relatively weak agricultural sectors. If they are to develop, they need to modernize, but the sources (technology, management, institutions) and resources (FDI) for that modernization will most likely not come from Russia. What Russia has that they have not to modernize? Before answering that key question a small detour is needed.
It is hard to imagine a genuine enthusiasm for the integration projects by most post-soviet leaders unless they will get out of this process tangible effects that can be sold politically to their own population and elites.
Thus the issue is whether Russia will be willing (or able) to pay an initial, very high price for re-integration in order to bring at least some economic and social stability to her periphery. A shift eastwards may also engender opposition from some elites, as most of the Russian elite is ?culturally? European. It is much easier to say that Asia is the future than it is to convince members of the elite to buy mansions in Bishkek instead of Paris and send their children to the University of Guangzhou instead of Cambridge.
On the other hand, it should be easier to convince the Central Asian states to join a re-integration project as they should ? on paper ? gain more than they will lose. The answer to the question of what Russia has that is attractive to others post-Soviet states (in particular in Central Asia) as a strong pro-integrative factor is ? paradoxically ? culture.
The Soviet period imposed a different (urbanized/industrialized) civilization that replaced regional cultural nomadic cultures of the Central Asian states. It is hard now for these states to reproduce a lost cultural identity and, thus, they remain closer to Russia than to other cultures. The paradox today is that Russia, being in search of its own identity, is none the less perceived as having an identity strong enough to be attractive to others. In that, Russia trumps other potential competitors in the region, and if that will be supported by a more attractive ?integration model? than proposed so far re-integration may really happen. The point is that culture matters as integrative tool, and here Russia has spare soft power to project eastward.
Does Russia have a choice, then, between European and Eurasian Union? In fact, in the short to medium term, she does not even have that option. The only viable strategic choice is in the Far East-Eurasian direction. Even midget in scope EU devised Eastern Partnership is failing. EU is politically not ready and economically unable to make a deal with Russia to bring her closer to EU as President Medvedev asked for; staying alone in not an option either as then Russia is carrying the risk of becoming lonely (and increasingly alienated).
There are two regions that developmentally/strategically matter today ? Siberia/Asia and Arctic. If Russia will be able to - technologically and socially - develop the Russian East (new resources, food, energy) and link it with Central Asia (resources and population) and with the Far East (capital, market and technologies), then the country can dramatically boost its status in the world.
The road to Russia?s future can only go through Siberia and Asia.
Piotr Dutkiewicz is Professor of Political Science, Director of the Center for Governance and Public Policy at Carleton University, Ottaw, member of the Valdai Discussion Club Advisory Board.
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Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Source: http://valdaiclub.com/near_abroad/36840.html
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